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TitleThe Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency
Tags Guerrilla Warfare International Politics Mao Zedong Insurgency
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Total Pages389
Table of Contents
                            Front Cover
The Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency
Copyright Page
List of illustrations
Notes on contributors
Preface and acknowledgements
1. The study of insurgency and counterinsurgency
Part I: Theoretical and analytical issues
	2. The historiography of insurgency
	3. Rethinking insurgency
	4. Changing forms of insurgency: pirates, narco gangs and failed states
	5. Cyberspace and insurgency
	6. Whither counterinsurgency: the rise and fall of a divisive concept
	7. Counterinsurgency and peace operations
	8. Insurgency, Counterinsurgency and Policing
	9. Intelligence-gathering, special operations and air strikes in modern counterinsurgency
	10. Ethics of counterinsurgency
	11. Counterinsurgency: the state of a controversial art
Part II: Insurgent movements
	12. Insurgent movements in Africa
	13. Insurgency in Iraq 2003–10
	14. Hezbollah and Hamas: Islamic insurgents with nationalist causes
	15. Insurgency in Southeast Asia
	16. Insurgencies in India
	17. Insurgency in Afghanistan
	18. Insurgent movements in Pakistan
	19. Post-Cold War Insurgency and counterinsurgency in Latin America
Part III: Counterinsurgency cases
	20. Trends in American Counterinsurgency
	21. Israeli counterinsurgency: the never-ending ‘whack-a-mole’
	22. From Belfast to Lashkar Gar via Basra: British Counterinsurgency today
	23. Counterinsurgency in a non-Democraticstate: The Russian example
	24. Counterinsurgency in India
	25. Counterinsurgency in Sri Lanka: a successful model?
	26. Counterinsurgency in Pakistan
	27. China’s Society-Centriccounterterrorism approach in Xinjiang
	28. South African Counterinsurgency: a historiographical overview
	29. Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: some conclusions
Document Text Contents
Page 2



This new handbook provides a wide- ranging overview of the current state of academic analysis
and debate on insurgency and counterinsurgency, as well as an up- to-date survey of contempor-
ary insurgent movements and counterinsurgencies.
In recent years, and more specifically since the insurgency in Iraq from 2003, academic inter-
est in insurgency and counterinsurgency has substantially increased. These topics have become
dominant themes on the security agenda, replacing peacekeeping, humanitarian operations and
terrorism as key concepts. The aim of this volume is to showcase the rich thinking that is avail-
able in the area of insurgency and counterinsurgency studies and act as a further guide for study
and research.
In order to contain this wide- ranging topic within an accessible and informative framework,
the editors have divided the text into three key parts:

• Part I: Theoretical and analytical issues
• Part II: Insurgent movements
• Part III: Counterinsurgency cases

The Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency will be of great interest to all students
of insurgency and small wars, terrorism/counter- terrorism, strategic studies, security studies and
IR in general, as well as professional military colleges and policymakers.

Paul B. Rich is co- editor of the journal Small Wars & Insurgencies and author/editor of ten

Isabelle Duyvesteyn is senior lecturer at the Department of History of International Relations
at the Institute of History, Utrecht University, the Netherlands, and author/editor of six

Page 194

Hezbollah and Hamas


Hezbollah is governed by the majlis ash- Shura – a consultative council of elected members
headed by Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah. Policy decisions are taken by discussion among
members until consensus is reached. Hezbollah’s military and security branches are directly
linked to this council. An Executive Council linked to the organization’s administrative and
political apparatus oversees foreign, social, educational, financial unionist and parliamentary
affairs (Hamzeh 2004: 46, 71–3; Rabil 2008: 5–12). There are reports of an overseas branch
governing activities in the United States, Latin America and Africa (Farah 2006; Diaz and
Newman 2006).
The three areas of Shiite concentration are administered in top- down fashion and on a street-
by-street basis in Beirut’s southern suburb where tight security prevails (Harb 2011: 132–34).

From guerrilla organization to Arab army

The 1982 Israeli invasion

Hezbollah’s emergence during the Israeli invasion and, according to Israeli and US sources, its
implication in a string of terrorist activities during that turbulent period, place it on the US State
Department’s list of terrorist organizations. However, the 1985 withdrawal of Israeli forces to a
so- called ‘Security Zone’ within Lebanon at the frontier afforded the Party of God a legitimate
resistance persona that it capitalized on during its 17-year- long guerrilla campaign to oust the
foreign troops and their South Lebanese Army (SLA) allies. The war of attrition drew major
Israeli air and land incursions in 1993 and 1996 to drive out Hezbollah but increased Israeli casu-
alties finally forced Israeli withdrawal behind a blue line designated by UN forces in May 2000
(see also Chapter 21 by Sergio Catignani in this volume). In full control of the frontier Hezbol-
lah was now able to increase the range of its rockets and to fortify the area despite the presence
of UN peacekeeping troops stationed there.

The 2006 conflict and its political aftermath

The 34-day battle unleashed after Hezbollah’s capture and killing of Israeli soldiers on 12 July 2006
resulted in the deaths of 159 Israeli and 1,019 Lebanese and massive displacement on both sides of
the frontier (Harel et al. 2009). While Lebanon was subjected to intensive Israeli bombardment of
infrastructure, dwellings and businesses, Israel’s ground offensive was nevertheless thwarted by
well- trained Hezbollah cadres and village fighters (Exum 2006: 9–10). During the battle the Israeli
state came under a relentless barrage of Katyusha rockets and medium range missiles that for the
first time reached as far as Haifa (Makovsky and White 2006, Exum 12–13).
Military analysts noted Hezbollah’s new blend of conventional and guerrilla tactics (Biddle 2007:
29–45) and its effective use of weapons (Exum 2006: 3–4; Kulik 2006; Cordesman et al. 2007).
In the autumn of 2006 Hezbollah sought to protect its arms by pressuring the anti- Syrian
authorities to form a national unity government in which its allies would have a blocking veto. The
refusal by these authorities to cooperate led to a paralysis of the government by a massive sit- in
spearheaded by Hezbollah that closed down Beirut’s commercial sector for close to two years. In
2007 opposition MPs also boycotted parliamentary sessions called to nominate a president whose
election might jeopardize the resistance (Harik 2007: 123–5). A compromise candidate was finally
endorsed in 2008. In May Hezbollah consolidated its political grasp by scotching a government
move to close down its intelligence system and by forcibly disarming opposing militias. These acts
together with its possession of increasingly powerful weaponry augmented the survivability of the
Hezbollah power structure in Lebanon (Cordesman and Nerguizien 2010).

Page 195

J. Palmer Harik and M. Johannsen


Outstanding issues

Hezbollah and the Lebanese state: hidden Islamic agenda or pragmatic politics?

Those who suggest Hezbollah has a pragmatic inclination (Hamzeh 1993; Norton 1998, 1999;
Harik 2004: 47; Harb and Leenders 2005: 189–91) point to several factors that limit the scope
of the movement’s future plans for Lebanon. Foremost is the impossibility of any one group’s
capacity to overturn the well- entrenched, multi- confessional political system without engen-
dering a bloodbath. In part the Lebanese civil war was fought to establish a more equitable
representation of the Muslim portion of the population rather than to change the political
formula of sectarian power sharing.
Moreover any plans to overturn the prevailing Lebanese political system have also been
found to be impractical given Syria’s interest in keeping the various communities in Lebanon
divided and thus manageable. Pragmatic Hezbollah leaders are therefore thought to be more
intent on integrating into the existing political system, enabling them to build power and pre-
serve and expand their resistance agenda; this will enable them to maintain their hegemony in
the Shiite community rather than attempt to create an Islamic state.
On the other side of this debate are those who assert that Hezbollah’s commitment to an
Islamic state for Lebanon is programmatic rather than ideological (Kramer 1990a; Sharara 1996;
Badran 2009). Citing organic ties with Iran and the expansion of mosques and seminaries in
Lebanon over the years, and underlining leaders’ insistence that resistance is Hezbollah’s raison
d’être and that all of Lebanon should join it, Badran makes the case that the latter plans to engulf
the Lebanese state rather than to integrate it.

All the way to Jerusalem – ideology or programme?

Hezbollah’s larger intent is the subject of considerable debate among analysts and scholars.
Those who argue that the organization has fixed goals to destroy Israel refer to the Islamist
premises that underpin its actions and Iran’s and the discourse of its leaders (Kramer 2006,
1990a; Harel et al. 2009: 259–60; Karman 2003: 15–16; Zisser 2002, 11). Others refute this
position arguing that the Party of God’s limited agenda focuses on the recovery of Lebanese and
Syrian occupied territories and on assistance to Hamas’ struggle rather than on plans to liberate
Jerusalem through its own efforts (Hamzeh 2004: 80, 108–35; Harik 2004: 47–8; Byman 2003;
Hajjar 2002: 16; Norton 1999: 3; 1998: 46). Nevertheless, Hezbollah’s expanding and more
sophisticated weaponry makes a greater role for Hezbollah in the Palestine–Israel conflict arena
more plausible than previously thought.

The challenges that lie ahead

Hezbollah faces two major challenges related to its survival as a resistance organization and both
concern its capacity to retain the allegiance of domestic and foreign supporters in the face of US
and Israeli efforts to erode its support.

Shiite and national solidarity vis- à-vis Israel’s strategy of ‘cumulative deterrence’

‘Cumulative deterrence’ attempts to elicit the compliance of a recalcitrant actor by repeated
applications of force assuming that resistance will eventually become too costly to continue
(Almog 2004–5). This strategy has guided Israel’s destruction of Lebanese infrastructure as a

Page 388

Smith, Gen. Rupert 58, 76
Smith, M.L.R. 365
Snow, donald 86
social change 54
social context 12, 360–1
social contract 39
social contract theory 119–20
Somalia 169, 258; piracy 47–8
Sons of Iraq 180
South Africa 160, 362; counterinsurgency

literature 350–5; ideology 348; influences on
writing and debate 348–50; journalism 354;
overview 347; strategic choices 348; summary
and conclusions 354

South African defence Force (SAdF) 348, 349–50
South Vietnam 8
Southeast Asia: overview 198; summary and

conclusions 205–6
Southern Africa, European colonial regimes 8
Soviet Union, pseudo-gangs 112
Spain, guerrillas 3
special forces operations 110–12, 114
Special Operations Command (SOCOM) (USA)

Special Task Force (STF ) (Sri Lanka) 316
spirituality 46, 50
spoilers 89
Sri Lanka 313, 361; armed forces recruitment 318;

change of government 315; civilians 319–20;
Eastern Province 315–16; history 312–15;
international environment 321; Long-Range
Reconnaissance Patrols (LRRP) 319, 322;
media 321; military factors 318–21; northern
front 316–18; overview 312; peace process 315;
political factors 320–1; summary and
conclusions 321–3; supply routes 320; tactics

Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission 317
stabilization operations 90, 100
stabilization principles 283
state authority: nature of 160–1; and nature of

insurgency 168
state-building 369
state, citizens’ expectations of 39
state formation, and counterinsurgency 129–30
state of nature 126
State Peace and development Council (SPdC)

(Burma) 204–5
state stability, and use of indigenous forces 115
Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) (US/Iraq) 180
Strachan, Hew 2, 14, 24, 72, 276–7
strategic aims, of counterinsurgency 72
strategic environment 137–8
strategic interest 32–3
strategies 45
strategy 360; counterinsurgency as 71–2; defining

72; insurgency as 37–8

Strauss, Barry 129
suicide bombers 176; ethics 126–7; Pakistan 234;

Sri Lanka 314
suicide bombs 12
suicide terrorism 271–2
Sullivan, John P. 46
superempowerment 60–1
surge strategy 177–8
symmetric irregular warfare 162

tache d’huile strategy 9
tactics 360
Taliban 222; aims 223–4; and al-Qaeda 223–4;

counterinsurgency 225; equipment 223;
governance, Pakistan 235–6; origins and
development 218–19; recruitment 224; size and
strength 219–20; strengths and weaknesses
224–5; structure and organization 220–2; see
also Pakistan

Tamari, Brig. Gen. dov 264
targeted killings 111, 115
Taylor, Charles 166–7
Technological-Attritive approach 325
technology 366; as substitute for risk 124; and

surveillance 169; urban insurgency 140; and
world-view 125

Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) 232, 329
teleology 38
territoriality 12
terrorism: vs. insurgency 38; narco-terrorism

Thailand 198–201
theory and practice, of counterinsurgency 69–71
theory of counterinsurgency, function and worth

thesis, counterinsurgency as 68–9, 74
third-generation warfare 59
Third Servile War 129
Thompson, Robert 84, 109, 137, 139
Thucydides 125
time constraints 141
Tolstoy, Leo 122
tools, choosing 125
topics of debate 364–5
trade-offs, structural 61
training: India 307; Pakistan 325
transnationalism 12, 281; Iraq 175; Lebanon 183–4
transnationality 138–9
tribal conflict, Pakistan 230–1
Trinquier, Roger 34
Tukhachevsky, Mikhail 290
Turkey, special forces operations 111
Turkistan Islamic Party 336–7

Ucko, david 13, 363
Uganda 165–6
UN Security Council Resolutions, impartiality 88



Page 389

understanding, of counterinsurgency 69
United Kingdom: counterinsurgency 84;

historiography 26–7; special forces operations
110–11; see also British counterinsurgency

United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)

United Nations, peace operations 82–3
United States 361; in Afghanistan 260; in Bosnia

258; changed priorities 67; in Colombia 245;
counterinsurgency era 73–4; historiography 26;
interventions 8; in Iraq 173–4, 179–80, 259,
284; in Kosovo 258–9; lack of involvement 32;
in Latin America 239; in Mexico 247; official
definitions 36, 68; in Somalia 258; special forces
operations 111; view of insurgency 35

United States counterinsurgency: Caribbean
253–5; Cold War counterinsurgency 255; El
Salvador 258; future of 260–1; HUK revolt
255–6; overview 251; Philippines 252–3;
relations with Britain 282; Vietnam 256–7;
Vietnam to 9/11 257–9

universities: effects of patronage 167; as sources of
leadership 159–60, 164

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) strikes 113, 115,
235, 319; ethics 123–5

urban insurgency 7, 140
Urumqi 338

Van Creveld, Martin 82
Vanni operation (Sri Lanka) 316–17
victory 145–6
Vietminh 9
Vietnam: Maoist model 8; people’s war 5; US in

73, 256–7
violence: drug trade 50–1; externalization of 123;

India 213–15; indiscriminate 163–4; and youth

virtual sanctuary 138, 139

vulnerability 38–9, 42

Wall, Robert 270, 271
Walzer, Michael 120
war: as educator 126; laws of 120; as political

phenomenon 76; understanding of 363; use of
term 36

war economies 40
War on Terror 62, 91, 278
warfare: insurgency as 34–5, 36–7; mediatized 58
warrior ethos 125
Wayne, Martin 362
weapons, types of 12
Weber, Max 130
Weinberger-Powell doctrine 85–6
Westmoreland, Gen William 257
Williams, R.M. Jr. 251
world-view, and technology 125
World War I, revolutionary opportunities 4
World War II, Germany 122

Xinjiang: al-Qaeda 338; counterinsurgency
339–44; development of insurgency 335–9;
education 343; governance 344; government
policies 343–4; overview 335; as threat to
China 340

youth, and violence 40
Yuen, Henry 124

Zaalberg, Thijs Brocades 364–5
Zaire 162
Zeitgeist 122
Zhukov, Yuri 361–2
Zimbabwe 8
zones of impunity 50
Zvekic, U. 102



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