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TitleGames, Groups, and the Global Good
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LanguageEnglish
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Table of Contents
                            Preface
Foreword
Contents
Contributors
Evolutionary Foundations of Cooperation and Group Cohesion
	1 Introduction
	2 Scope
	3 Evolutionary Dynamics
	4 Biological History
	5 Historical Analogy
	6 Historical Consequence
	References
How to Evolve Cooperation
	1 Introduction
	2 Evolutionary Game Dynamics
	3 Direct Reciprocity
	4 Indirect Reciprocity
	5 Kin Selection
	6 Group Selection
	7 Graph Selection
	8 Conclusion
	References
Beyond Enlightened Self-Interest: Social Norms, Other-Regarding Preferences, and Cooperative Behavior
	1 Introduction
	2 Folk Theorems and Evolutionary Dynamics
	3 Dynamically Irrelevant Equilibria
	4 Social Norms in the Public Goods Game
	5 Directed Punishment
	6 Altruistic Punishing in the Public Goods Game
	7 The Evolutionary Emergence and Stability of Altruistic Punishment
	8 Conclusion: The Missing Choreographer
	References
Evolution, Cooperation, and Repeated Games
	References
Public Good Games with Incentives: The Role of Reputation
	1 A Philosophical Entente Cordiale
	2 Public Goods and Private Incentives
	3 The Mini-Trust Game
	4 The Dynamics of Two-Role Games
	5 Staying in the Saddle
	6 Farewell to Trust
	7 Ultimate Offers
	8 Bifurcation Through Reputation
	9 Public Goods with Punishment
	10 Dynamics with Reputation
	11 Revealing Errors
	12 Public Goods with Rewards
	13 Larger Groups
	14 Discussion
	References
Groups and Networks: Their Role in the Evolution of Cooperation
	1 Groups and Networks
	2 Partner Choice and Network Dynamics
	3 Making Friends, Stag Hunt
	4 Co-evolution of Structure and Strategy
	5 Prisoner’s Dilemma
	6 An Experiment
	7 Beyond Reinforcement
	References
Evolution and Construction of Moral Systems
	1 Introduction
	2WhatisaMoralSystem?
	3 Major Components of Moral Systems
	4 Constraints on Moral Systems
	5 Architecture of Moral Systems
	6 Construction Dynamics of Moral Systems
	7 Summary
	References
Games, Groups, Norms, and Societies
	1 Introduction
	2 Group Formation and Dynamics
	3 Cooperation, from Bacteria to Bees
	4 Animal Schooling and Swarming, and the Role of Leadership
	5 Groups and Norms in Human Societies
	6 Formalizing Rules and Codes of Conduct: The Evolution of Moral Systems
	References
Evolutionary Theory and Cooperation in Everyday Life
	1 Human Cooperation in Everyday Life
	2 Toward the Integration of Academic Disciplines and a Positive Tradeoff Between Basic and Applied Research
	References
The Error of God: Error Management Theory, Religion, and the Evolution of Cooperation
	1 Error Management Theory (EMT)
	2 Application to Religious Beliefs
	3 Towards a more Formal Model
	4 Predictions and Evidence
	5 Conclusion
	References
Moral Motivation
	References
Explaining Religion: Notes Toward a Research Agenda
	References
Building Trust to Solve Commons Dilemmas: Taking Small Steps to Test an Evolving Theory of Collective Action
	1 A Theoretical Puzzle
	2 The Challenges Ahead
	3 The First Challenge
	4 What are We Learning about Norms and the Context of Social Dilemmas?
	5 What is Next on the Agenda?
	6 Conclusion
	References
How Democracy Resolves Conflic in Difficul Games
	1 Introduction
	2 Resolution by Voting in a 2-Person PD
	3 Resolution by Voting in an n-Person PD
	4 Example of an n-Person PD
	5 A Biblical Tale
	6 Other Difficul Games
	7 Conclusions
	References
Two Strategic Issues in Apologizing
	1 The Duty to Apologize Within a Normative System
	2 Why are Apologies All-or-Nothing?
	3 Game Theory as a Tool for the Analysis of Norms
	Appendix Condition for the Apologize-and-Restitute Equilibrium
	The Robustness of Apologize-and-Restitute
	References
Neither Self-interest Nor Self-sacrifice The Fraternal Morality of Market Relationships
	1 Trust as Gift Exchange
	2 The Trust Game
	3 Social-preference Explanations of Trust
	4 Trustworthiness as a Character Virtue
	5 Team Reasoning and Collective Intentions
	6 The Fraternal Morality of Market Relationships
	References
                        
Document Text Contents
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Springer Series in Game Theory

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GR01.eps


134 J.C. Flack and D.C. Krakauer

components and the rules transforming these connectivities. The theory should seek
to explain how individual preferences and biases feed forward, generating collective
moral rules that feedback to modify individual behavior, including each individ-
ual’s sense of fairness and moral judgments. The theory should also explain how,
and with what implications, a partial time scale separation arises between the rate
of change of moral rules at the aggregate level, moral judgments at the individual
level, and the within-individual sense of fairness (for further discussion of this time
scale issue, see Boehm and Flack In Press). The theory seeks to explain the origin
of moral rules, their stability properties and their long-term trajectories, as well as
delimiting a space of degenerate rule sets – different moral system configurations
all compatible with individual biases.

A natural theoretical framework for a theory of moral system dynamics is niche
construction (Lewontin 1982; Laland et al. 1996; Odling-Smee et al. 2003; Odling-
Smee 2007). Niche construction considers those traits of a phenotype capable of
modifying the environment of the organism, thereby allowing for selection pressures
(niche parameters) to be partly encoded in the organismal genome. This property
has been called the extended phenotype (Dawkins 1982). Niche construction over-
comes an “adiabatic” property built into Darwinian dynamics, which means that
the environment and the organism have typically been treated as time-separable
dynamical systems and their reciprocal interactions neglected. The adiabatic prop-
erty arises because the rate of change of the environment, and the processes shaping
its construction, are treated as very slow relative to the organismal lineages that
it shapes. The standard Darwinian framework and the extended niche construction
framework are illustrated in Fig. 1. In niche construction the niche and the organism

Fig. 1 The difference between a standard, “adiabatic”, Darwinian model for selection (top) in
contrast to a niche construction dynamic (bottom). In the top panel the social selection pressures
(feedback constraints), denoted by z, are not influenced by the actions of the agents x whose future
representation is determined by their interactions in the selective field provided by z. In the bottom
panel, the strategies actively shape their social niche, thereby modifying the cost benefit structure
of their interactions. The construction of the social niche (“reinforcing mechanisms” in the text)
comes at a cost of a reduced, direct investment in the proliferation of the individual strategies

Page 149

Evolution and Construction of Moral Systems 135

are coupled, such that the constructor can partially control the rate of change and/or
the trajectory of the environmental variables (Boehm and Flack In Press). The cou-
pling leads to the emergence of frequency-dependence, or game dynamics, from a
formally density-dependent dynamic. Niche construction is, however, distinguished
from standard frequency dependence by the explicit incorporation of a construction
dynamic that builds the second variable, and by the explicit treatment of the emer-
gence of a partial separation of timescales between these variables. The critical point
is that by controlling the environmental variable, the constructor is able to reduce
uncertainty in the environment. This in turns allows the constructor to better adapt
to its environment thereby improving resource extraction.

A niche construction style theory that addresses all of the requirements discussed
in this chapter is not yet available. However, we can make some progress in the
direction a moral systems dynamics, by considering how low level components, say
a sense of fairness (here called strategies), interact or compete with other strate-
gies, while engaging in a construction process generating reinforcing mechanisms,
policing for example. The reinforcing mechanism can either promote consensus
for one particular strategy over another, or allow multiple strategies to coexist that
would otherwise be outcompeted. A simple interpretation of a moral rule would then
be the vector of stable strategies supported by the reinforcement mechanism. So if
individuals adopting the golden rule are in competition with “turn the other cheek”,
advocates of both might invest in the construction of a similar mechanism for broad-
casting their beliefs. The outcome of competition under this new framework, we
might think of as the moral rule adopted in the society. A more sophisticated moral
rule would have to involve more than a linear combination of the initial strategies
and constitute an additional layer of regulation biasing the broadcast of individual
judgments.

In Fig. 1 we consider the first, simple case where we have a coupled system
with a single-dimensional niche, which acts as a reinforcing mechanism on a two
dimensional strategy vector. In terms of differential equations we might write,

Pxi D f .Ex; z/
Pz D g.z; Ex/;

where the vector of individual rule frequencies, Px contributes to the frequency of
aggregate rules by constructing reinforcing mechanisms like broadcasting or polic-
ing, z. These feed back to contribute to the population densities of x

i
. We might

choose to consider a very simple competitive dynamic, where individuals contribute
to constructing reinforcing mechanisms that bias the consensus generating process
toward their particular sense of fairness. Consider two competing senses of fairness.
Lets say that advocates of each of sense of fairness invest in their favored moral
rule by building a broadcasting mechanism. The key here is that the broadcasting
mechanism allows arbitrary, individual fairness rules to be amplified into the pop-
ulation level moral rule. This kind of reinforcement paradigm is effective for all
fairness rules, and is not selective of rule content. Hence rule advocates can benefit
from a competitor shouldering the burden of investment in building the architecture

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282 R. Sugden

Acknowledgements This paper draws on ideas I have developed in joint work with Luigino Bruni.
I thank Herbert Gintis and Brian Skyrms for comments on a previous draft. My work was supported
by the Economic and Social Research Council (award no. RES 051 27 0146).

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