Download Android malware analysis PDF

TitleAndroid malware analysis
TagsAndroid (Operating System) Malware Google Play Smartphone Java Programming Language
File Size1.4 MB
Total Pages28
Document Text Contents
Page 1

Android Malware
Past, Present, and Future

Carlos A. Castillo
Mobile Security Working Group

White Paper

Page 2

White Paper Android Malware—Past, Present, and Future

Table of Contents
Executive Summary 3

Introduction 3

The History of Android Malware 4

Android Fundamentals 9

Methodologies and Tools to Analyze Android Malware 11

Mobile Malware Evolution 12

The past: Fake Player 12

The present 17

The future 24

Conclusion 25

Acknowledgements 25

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White Paper Android Malware—Past, Present, and Future

When the object “localDataHelper” is created, the constructor method will open another object
(OpenHelper) and will also prepare an SQL statement to insert the value “was” in the existing
database “table1”:

Figure 6. DataHelper Constructor preparing the SQL statement to insert a “was” in the SQLite database.

Inside the class DataHelper, there is an embedded class called OpenHelper, which is responsible for
creating the SQLite database movieplayer.db with only one field (was).

Figure 7. Fake Windows Media Player creating a SQLite database.

Once the database is created and the SQL statement is compiled, the method canwe is executed:

Figure 8. Canwe method.

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White Paper Android Malware—Past, Present, and Future

However, the code showed by JD-GUI contains strange instructions like an “if” already closed (with
a ;) and a “for” with a “return” that does not make any sense. This suggests that perhaps the Java
decompiler tool is not interpreting the code correctly and is not showing the correct instructions. For
this reason, when static analysis of Android malware is performed, it is important to use several Java
decompilers in order to maximize the chances of getting the best representation of the original source
code. In this case DJ Java decompiler71 was used, and now the canwe method is understandable:

Figure 9. canwe method with DJ Java Decompiler.

Once the SQLite database is created and initiated, and if the method canwe returns true, the application
will show text in Russian (“Wait, requesting access to the video library ...”) and will try to send an SMS
to the number “3353”:

Figure 10. Showing the text message and sending an SMS to premium-rate numbers.

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White Paper Android Malware—Past, Present, and Future

51. NetQin. “Security Alert: Fee-Deduction Malware on Android Devices Spotted in the Wild.” [Online] May 30, 2011. http://www.prnewswire.

52. AVG Mobilation. “Malware information: BaseBridge.” [Online] May 23, 2011.

53. Jiang, Xuxian. “Security Alert: New Sophisticated Android Malware DroidKungFu Found in Alternative Chinese App Markets.” [Online]
May 31, 2011.

54. Apvrille, Axelle. “Android/DroidKungFu uses AES encryption.” [Online] June 9, 2011.

55. Android. “Android Developers.” [Online]

56. SQLite. SQLite. [Online]

57. Case, Justin. [Updated] “Exclusive: Vulnerability In Skype For Android Is Exposing Your Name, Phone Number, Chat Logs, And A Lot More.”
[Online] April 14, 2011.

58. Asher, Adrian. “Privacy vulnerability in Skype for Android fixed.” [Online] April 20, 2011.

59. Ehringer, David. “THE DALVIK VIRTUAL MACHINE ARCHITECTURE.” [Online] March 2010.

60. Machine, Dalvik Virtual. Dalvik Virtual Machine. [Online]

61. “Guide, Android Developers--Dev. Application Fundamentals.” [Online]

62. android4me. “J2ME port of Google’s Android.” [Online] October 9, 2008.

63. dex2jar. “A tool for converting Android’s .dex format to Java’s .class format.” [Online]

64. Decompiler, Java. “Yet another fast java decompiler.” [Online]

65. Gabor, Paller. “MY LIFE WITH ANDROID :-).” [Online] January 9, 2009.

66. Meyer, Jonathan and Reynaud, Daniel. JASMIN HOME PAGE. [Online] 2004.

67. Paller, Gabor. “Dalvik opcodes.” [Online]

68. smali. “An assembler/disassembler for Android’s dex format.” [Online]

69. HEX-RAYS. “IDA Pro 6.1 feature list.” [Online]

70. Bornstein, Dan. “Dalvik Docs Mirror.’ [Online]


72. Jiand, Xuxian. “Security Alert: New Stealthy Android Spyware—Plankton—Found in Official Android Market.” [Online] June 6, 2011.

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McAfee is relentlessly focused on constantly finding new ways to keep our customers safe. Apvrille, Axelle. �Android/DroidKungFu uses AES encryption.� [Online] June 9, 2011. Apvrille, Axelle. �Android/DroidKungFu uses AES encryption.� [Online] June 9, 2011. Apvrille, Axelle. �Android/DroidKungFu uses AES encryption.� [Online] June 9, 2011.

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